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Abstract
We study empirically the role of education, age structure and other socioeconomic
factors as a determinant of the transition to stable democratic regimes. Our find-
ings suggest that educational improvements (in particular in primary education) and
policies towards reducing inequalities in educational attainment play a particularly im-
portant role as a catalyst of sustainable democratization processes.
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I Introduction
Political scientists and economists have shown great interest in unveiling the determinants
of the transition from autocratic to democratic regimes. In particular, the role played by
education as a catalyst of democratization processes has been the focus of many studies, both
of theoretical and empirical nature. Many authors argue that education introduces a “culture
of democracy” by rising the benefits of civic participation such as voting an organizing and
promoting interest in politics and political activities. The results of this body of research
suggest that, at the aggregate level, both the changes in overall educational attainment and
the degree of equality in the distribution of education among members of a society contribute
to explaining transitions to democracy.
Using a global sample of countries covering information for 125 economies, Helliwell (1994)
finds that secondary education is a significant predictor of democracy. The results in Barro
(1999) support that higher primary school attainment rates as well as a smaller gender
gap in educational attainment tend to be related to more democratic political regimes.
Although these results have been challenged by Acemoglu et al. (2005), who fail to find a
statistically significant effect of education in explaining democratic transitions, Bobba and
Coviello (2007) argue that this result is driven by weak identification and weak instruments
problems in the econometric strategy used. In addition, Bobba and Coviello (2007) show
that education systematically predicts democracy in the sample used by Acemoglu et al.
(2005) once the adequate dynamic panel data estimation method is used. These empirical
results find further support in the analysis carried out by Lutz et al. (2009), who focus on
the interaction between demographic developments and education expansions and find that,
in addition to improvements in educational attainment, declines in fertility rates also tend
to predict democratization processes.
Castelo´-Climent (2008) explores the role that the distributional dimension of education plays
as a determinant of democracy. The empirical results in Castelo´-Climent (2008) confirm that
in addition to average years of schooling, changes in how the educational attainment of the
population is distributed among individuals is an important factor explaining transitions to
democracy. The findings of Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008b) point in the same direction,
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showing that high levels of educational attainment are not only linked to a higher probability
of a country undertaking a democratic transition, but also to the speed of the transition and
the intensity of the political reforms carried out.
While most authors aim at isolating the causal link running from education to democracy,
there is plenty of evidence that political regimes have an effect on educational attainment.
Stasavage (2005), for example, finds a positive relationship between multi party electoral
competition and spending in primary education. Barro (1998, 1999), Glaeser et al. (2004)
and Glaeser et al. (2007) identify causality by comparing political regime outcomes with
past education realizations. In this sense, the statistical linkages are identified as causal in
the sense of Granger-causality.1 Some authors address the question of causality between
education and democracy making use of natural experiments. Milligan et al. (2004) ex-
ploit exogenous changes in compulsory schooling laws to identify the role of education as a
determinant of the likelihood of becoming politically involved and find sizeable effects for
the US. Dee (2004) finds that voter turnout is increased after improvements in educational
attainment caused by (exogenous) changes in the availability of junior and community col-
leges. Castelo´-Climent (2008) and Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008b) account for reverse
causation by restricting their respective samples to countries that were dictatorships at the
beginning of the period under investigation.
In this paper we contribute to the literature in several aspects. On the one hand, we
complement the existing literature by concentrating exclusively on stable political regimes
and thus studying the factors that lead to long-lasting spells of democracy, which we refer
to as sustained democracy periods. Most of the existing studies that investigate the driving
factors of democratic transitions tend to neglect this issue and concentrate on the short-run
dynamics of measures of political rights or civil liberties.2 On the other hand, we explore
the interaction of changes in educational attainment and in age structure as a determinant
of sustained democratization processes. Our results emphasize the privileged role played
by education and its distribution among individuals as a predictor of sustained political
1Acemoglu et al. (2005) point out that the results of Glaeser et al. (2004, 2007) are not robust to changes
in the model specification and find that the omission of initial income per capita in a regression of regime
type as the dependent variable results in an insignificant education coefficient in some cases. Including time
fixed effects, the effect of the education variable also becomes statistically insignificant.
2Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008b) are an exception and control for regime stability by putting the
restriction on their democracy indicator to stay in the new regime category for at least five years and change
this threshold to up to seven years. We focus on a longer time horizon of 15 years in the main analysis
presented here.
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change. In particular, we find that steps towards reducing inequality in education across age
groups and between males and females tend to be linked to a higher probability of sustained
democratization.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data used, as well as the method
employed to define sustained democracy periods. Section 3 presents the empirical results
based on binary dependent models and performs checks aimed at ensuring that the results
are robust. Section 4 concludes.
II Measuring Sustained Democracy
Several available datasets provide measures for political rights and civil liberties which can
be used to build democracy indicators. The Polity IV Project database on Political Regime
Characteristics and Transitions by Marshall et al. (2011), data on political rights and civil
liberties provided by Gastil (various years), which is compiled and updated in the Freedom
in the World database by Freedom House, the ACLP Political and Economic Database by
Alvarez et al. (1999), the democracy database by Vanhanen (2000) and a database by Pa-
paioannou and Siourounis (2008a), just to name a few. A detailed overview of the reliability
of data on democracy is provided by Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008a,b) and for data
on the quality of institutions by Glaeser et al. (2004). In all of the three papers the au-
thors stress that the Polity IV political regime index is the most comprehensive one when
compared to other indicators.3 The same applies to the data on institutional quality.4
The quantitative assessment of the determinants of democratization processes is frequently
plagued with potential reverse causation problems, which may lead to biased estimates and
misleading inference. In the spirit of other studies which circumvent this problem by im-
posing restrictions to the democracy variable,5 we create an indicator of sustained political
regimes, which identifies (relatively long) periods where the political regime of a given coun-
try remained stable. The Polity IV democracy index (variable polity2 in the dataset) ranges
3Papaioannou and Siourounis compare the Polity IV dataset to the Freedom House political rights and
civil liberties indicators and the Alvarez et al. (1996) and Przeworski et al. (2000) regime classification, as
well as to an update of this dataset by Golder (2005).
4Glaeser et al. (2004) compare Polity IV data with survey indicators of institutional quality from the
International Country Risk Guide and an index of government effectiveness collected by Kaufmann et al.
(2003).
5See, for example, Castelo´-Climent (2008) and Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008b) who account for
reverse causation by looking at countries that were dictatorships at the beginning of the period considered.
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from -10 (strong autocracy) to +10 (strong democracies). The construction of our index
relies on measures of competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of executive re-
cruitment, constraints on chief executive, regulation of participation and competitiveness of
participation. We start by classifying country-year observations as autocracies for a polity
score of -10 to -4 and as democracies for a polity score of +4 to +10. A country is said
to experience a sustained democracy (autocracy) period if the democracy index does not
move beyond the threshold defining democratic (autocratic) regimes within a period of 15
years. Our analysis is based on the collapsed cross sectional dataset composed by episodes of
sustained autocratic regimes and sustained democratic regimes in the period 1960-2011. To
rule out possible remaining endogeneity bias arising from the fact that a change in political
rights of a country could affect a change in our variables of interest, all possible explanatory
variables are evaluated at the beginning of the corresponding episode in the empirical analy-
sis carried out.6 Applying this definition, we are only able to include in our sample countries
that were not classified as democracies at the beginning of the sample in 1960. We have only
a small number of autocracy observations in our sample if we proceed in the same way as
for democracies, since the starting date of sustained autocratic episodes tends to be earlier
in our sample. Evaluating the explanatory variables at the starting date leads thus to a big
loss of autocracy observations as our data for explanatory variables does not cover the years
before 1960. Therefore, we evaluate each potential explanatory variable at its mean for the
corresponding time window in the case of sustained autocratic episodes.
The dataset constructed is composed by 100 observations of sustained political regime
episodes corresponding to 84 countries, which are presented in Table 1. Benin, Bulgaria,
Hungary, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Panama,
Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, Romania, and Spain are included in both the autocratic and
democratic sample at different points in time.
6A similar technique is used by Kraay and Nehru (2006) in the framework of debt crises in order to
identify debt distress episodes.
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Table 1: Sustained political regime episodes in the sample
Country Year∗ Country Year∗
1 Albania (a) 1969.5 43 Kazakhstan (a) 1998
2 Algeria (a) 1970 44 Kenya (a) 1977.5
3 Azerbaijan (a) 1998 45 Korea, Rep. (d) 1988
4 Bahrain (a) 1987 46 Lao People’s Dem.Rep (a) 1988
5 Bangladesh (d) 1991 47 Lesotho (a) 1976
6 Belarus (a) 1998.5 48 Liberia (a) 1972.5
7 Benin (a) 1975.5 (a), 1991 (d) 49 Madagascar (a) 1977.5 (a), 1992 (d)
8 Bhutan (a) 1977 50 Malawi (a) 1973.5 (a), 1994 (d)
9 Bolivia (d) 1982 51 Mali (a) 1970 (a), 1992 (d)
10 Brazil (d) 1985 52 Mauritania (a) 1977.5
11 Bulgaria (a) 1969.5 (a), 1990 (d) 53 Mexico (a) 1963 (a), 1994 (d)
12 Burkina Faso (a) 1984.5 54 Mongolia (a) 1969.5 (a), 1992 (d)
13 Burundi (a) 1973.5 55 Morocco (a) 1983
14 Cameroon (a) 1980.5 56 Mozambique (a) 1979 (a), 1994 (d)
15 Cape Verde (d) 1991 57 Nepal (a) 1965
16 Central African Republic (a) 1971 58 Nicaragua (a) 1965 (a), 1990 (d)
17 Chad (a) 1963.5 59 Niger (a) 1970
18 Chile (d) 1989 60 Panama (a) 1973 (a), 1989 (d)
19 China,P.R.: Mainland (a) 1980.5 61 Paraguay (a) 1969 (a), 1992 (d)
20 Congo, Dem. Rep. of (a) 1978 62 Philippines (d) 1987
21 Congo, Republic of (a) 1971.5 63 Poland (a) 1969 (a), 1989 (d)
22 Cuba (a) 1981 64 Portugal (a) 1961.5 (a), 1976 (d)
23 Coˆte d’Ivoire (a) 1974 65 Qatar (a) 1986
24 Djibouti (a) 1982.5 66 Romania (a) 1969 (a), 1990 (d)
25 Egypt (a) 1977 67 Rwasnda (a) 1976.5
26 El Salvador (d) 1984 68 Saudi Arabia (a) 1980.5
27 Equatorial Guinea (a) 1985 69 Senegal (a) 1965
28 Eritrea (a) 1997 70 Sierra Leone (a) 1978
29 Ethiopia (a) 1970.33 71 Somalia (a) 1979.5
30 Gabon (a) 1978.71 72 Spain (a) 1962 (a), 1978 (d)
31 Gambia, The (a) 1997.5 73 Sudan (a) 1994
32 Guatemala (d) 1996 74 Suriname (d) 1991
33 Guinea (a) 1972 75 Swasziland (a) 1987
34 Guinea-Bissau (a) 1978.5 76 Syrian Arab Republic (a) 1982
35 Guyana (d) 1992 77 Tanzania (a) 1972.5
36 Haiti (a) 1969.5 78 Togo (a) 1970.5
37 Honduras (d) 1982 79 Tunisia (a) 1968
38 Hungary (a) 1968.5 (a), 1990 (d) 80 Turkmenistan (a) 1996
39 Indonesia (a) 1974 81 Uruguay (d) 1985
40 Iran, Islamic Republic of (a) 1972.13 82 Uzbekistan (a) 1996
41 Iraq (a) 1979.5 83 Vietnam (a) 1988.5
42 Jordan (a) 1969 84 Zambia (a) 1976
(a) refers to episodes corresponding to autocratic regimes.
(d) refers to episodes corresponding to democratic regimes.
∗For democracies year indicates the year at which explanatory variables are evaluated (initial year).
∗For autocracies year indicates the mean year for the time window over which explanatory variables are averaged.
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III Education and the Transition to Sustained Democracy: The
Empirical Evidence
1 The Econometric Setting
Using the sustained political regime classification, we assess the role played by human capital
and other factors as determinants of democratization using standard probit models. The
specification is thus given by
P (yi = 1|Xi) = F (xiβ|X) (1)
where yi takes value one if that episode is a sustained democratic period and zero if it is a
sustained autocratic period, X is a matrix of explanatory variables with rows given by xi,
β is the corresponding column vector of parameters and F (z) is the the cumulative normal
distribution function.
In addition to educational attainment, which is the central interest of our analysis, the lit-
erature on the determinants of political change proposes several categories of variables that
should theoretically be able to account for democratization processes and thus can be in-
cluded in the set of explanatory variables in equation (1). Differences in the demographic
structure of countries have often been put forward as a determinant of differences in political
outcomes. A high proportion of young individuals has been often found to have a destabi-
lizing effect on political regimes (Cincotta, 2008), a phenomenon that is often referred to as
the youth bulge. To the extent that the age structure of a society is determined by fertility
and mortality patterns, econometric models aiming at identifying the forces driving durable
democratization processes should account for differences in demographic determinants in
their specifications (see Lutz et al., 2009, for example).
The importance of income and wealth as prerequisites for democracy is already pointed
out by Lipset (1959). Barro (1999) emphasizes that economic development has to precede
democratization for the resulting regime to be stable. Acemoglu et al. (2009), however,
show that the result of previous empirical studies that found per capita income a signifi-
cant predictor of democratization was driven by omitted variable bias. Lo´pez-Co´rdova and
Meissner (2005) provide evidence that trade openness positively influences the likelihood of
democratization through its positive effect on economic growth. Related arguments can be
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put forward to hypothesize that income inequality is an additional factor affecting democ-
ratization. Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) argue that inequality induces democratization
due to higher social unrest. Bourguignon and Verdier (2000), on the contrary, suggest that
inequality in income has adverse effects on democratization.
Beyond differences in income and wealth, other dimensions of heterogeneity have been
claimed to affect the likelihood of sustainable democratization episodes. Ethnolinguistic
fractionalization as a measure for heterogeneity of the population has been often included
in econometric models of democratization, leading in general to conclude that high levels
of fractionalization translate into a lower probability of transition to democracy (see Barro,
1999; Przeworski et al., 2000; Glaeser et al., 2004; Castelo´-Climent, 2008, for some exam-
ples). Cultural and religious factors are also usually highlighted as potential determinants
of democratization and tend to be included in regression models either as binary variables
which identify cultural characteristics or as covariates measuring the share of population
with different religious affiliations (see Huntington, 1992; Lipset, 1994; Barro, 1999; Castelo´-
Climent, 2008, among others). Urbanization rates are also found to be positively related to
democratization, partly due to preceding industrialization (see Castelo´-Climent, 2008, as an
example).
Some authors argue that the colonial history of a country has a significant effect on demo-
cratic transitions due to the institutional legacy inherited from the Western settlers (see
Barro, 1999; Lipset, 1994; Acemoglu et al., 2001). In the empirical literature, countries which
are natural resource abundant have been found to face a lower probability of a transition
to sustained democracy. Barro (1999), for example, argues that the pressure for democrati-
zation is higher for income generated from the accumulation of human and physical capital
than for income associated with natural resources.7
In our analysis, control variables based on the theoretical linkages proposed above are con-
sidered as potential determinants of the likelihood of a sustained democracy spell.
7In addition, Crespo Cuaresma et al. (2011) find that, after controlling for other determinants, dictator-
ships tend to have a larger duration in oil-abundant countries.
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2 Education and Sustained Democracy
We start by estimating a simple specification where the explanatory variables are the share
of the working age population (ages 15-64) with primary education and the proportion of
the working age population with higher education (completed junior secondary education
or higher), sourced from the IIASA dataset (Lutz et al., 2007),8 and the natural logarithm
of GDP per capita, sourced from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators Dataset.
These explanatory variables are used as the set of fixed covariates in all probit regressions
of the analysis. The inclusion of educational variables corresponding to different levels of
attainment informs us of their potentially different effect on democratization processes, while
the income variable accounts for other factors related to economic development beyond
education.
The first column in Table 2 displays the results of the probit regression which includes
these variables. The effect of the education variables is significantly positive and similar
across attainment levels, while that of income turns out to be insignificant. Evaluating all
variables at their means, a one standard deviation rise in the proportion of the working age
population with primary education leads to a 16.3 percentage points higher probability of
a country becoming a stable democracy on average.9 A similar effect is found for higher
education where a one standard deviation increase leads to a rise in probability of 15.7
percentage points for a stable transition.
In columns (2) to (6) of Table 2 we control sequentially for effects arising through the
distribution of education between males and females and/or across age groups. We form
educational attainment variables based on two age groups, the young(er) and old(er) working
age population, composed by people with ages between 15 and 39 and between 40 to 64,
respectively. Educational variables based on these age groups are added as explanatory
covariates to the base regression. In particular, we create gap variables corresponding to
differences in the corresponding educational attainment shares between males and females
(gender gap variables) as well as between the young and old age groups (age difference
variables).
Controlling for the gender gap variables in columns (2) to (4) does not qualitatively affect
8We use the term primary education and higher education to refer to the educational attainment corre-
sponding to these variables throughout the text.
9All explanatory variables have been standardized to have mean zero and unit variance prior to estimation.
Descriptive statistics of all the original variables in the analysis can be found in the Appendix.
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Table 2: Probit regressions: Basic model and education variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Primary education (15-64) 0.163∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.050) (0.054) (0.049) (0.053) (0.061)
Higher education (15-64) 0.157∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗ 0.142∗∗ 0.151∗∗ 0.106 0.094
(0.052) (0.065) (0.067) (0.062) (0.068) (0.068)
Ln(GDP pc) -0.003 -0.014 -0.018 -0.008 0.013 -0.017
(0.054) (0.058) (0.060) (0.056) (0.057) (0.062)
Gender gap primary (15-64) 0.017
(0.058)
Gender gap higher (15-64) -0.099∗∗
(0.047)
Gender gap primary (15-39) 0.033
(0.060)
Gender gap higher (15-39) -0.135∗∗∗
(0.051)
Gender gap primary (40-64) -0.036
(0.055)
Gender gap higher (40-64) -0.030
(0.050)
Age difference primary -0.094
(0.066)
Age difference higher -0.053
(0.064)
Age difference gender gap primary 0.059
(0.053)
Age difference gender gap higher -0.104∗
(0.064)
N 100 100 100 100 100 100
Pseudo-R2 0.159 0.197 0.219 0.167 0.172 0.205
The dependent variable takes value one for sustained democratic episodes.
Marginal effects reported; standard errors in parenthesis. All explanatory variables are standardized.
∗ (∗∗) [∗∗∗] stands for significance at the 10% (5%) [1%] level.
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the estimates of the variables included in the base specification. Controlling for gender gaps
in the working age population in column (2), the natural logarithm of per capita GDP stays
insignificant, while primary and higher educational attainment are significant and positively
related to democratization. The gender gap in primary education is statistically insignificant,
while the gender gap in higher education has a significantly negative parameter estimate.
This is in line with the findings of Barro (1999), Castelo´-Climent (2008) and Lutz et al. (2009)
that a more equal distribution of education between males and females rises the probability
of democratization. On average, for the same level of overall education, two societies that
differ in one standard deviation in terms of the gender gap in higher education differ in the
probability of becoming a sustained democracy by 9.9 percentage points, where the country
with a lower gap has a higher likelihood of being a sustainable democracy. The results
presented in columns (3) and (4) of Table 2 correspond to models which concentrate on
tighter age groups than the standard 15-64 age bracket when defining the education gender
gap variables. In particular, in column (3) we control for gender gaps by educational level in
the younger working age population and in column (4) for gender gaps in the older working
age population. The coefficient of the gender gap in higher education stays significantly
negative for the young working age population, indicating the importance of an equally
distributed education among young people to ensure the stability of democratic regimes.
The gender gap in primary education is insignificant for both subgroups once that overall
educational attainment is controlled for.
Concentrating on the distribution of education between age groups, the results in column (5)
of Table 2 show that the difference in education between young and old age groups does not
appear to be a significant driver of democratization beyond the global level of educational
attainment. In alternative specifications that do not include the higher educational attain-
ment variable (not shown here but available from the authors upon request) the parameter
estimate of the primary education attainment difference across age groups is significantly.
Although this provides some evidence that more equality in primary education between age
groups might also act as a driver of democratization, it is not clear if the result is driven
indeed by smaller age gaps or, in contrast, by the higher level of education in those countries.
Age differences in primary education are highly correlated to higher education (-0.68), while
the correlation of age differences in higher education with the proportion of people in higher
education is somewhat lower (0.53).
In the last column of Table 2 we assess the potential effect of changes of inequality in
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education by controlling for differences in gender gaps between the young and the old working
age population of a country. If a closing gender gap between the two generations leads to
higher probabilities of becoming a sustained democracy, we expect a negative coefficient
estimate in the variables. The effect of such gender-age education gap variables in primary
education turns out to be insignificant, while the one for higher education is marginally
significant at the 10 percent level.10
In Table 3 we expand the base regression including demographic variables. Potential age
structure effects are analysed including variables that measure the proportion of popula-
tion in different age brackets (population below age 15, between ages 15 and 39, between
ages 15 and 64 and above age 65) over total population as regressors in a sequential man-
ner. In columns (5) to (7) we also control for dependency ratios, based on the working
age population instead of on the whole population. The coefficient estimates of the base
regressors are not affected by the sequential inclusion of the age group variables. All of the
additional regressors that control for demographic structures turn out to have insignificant
coefficients. However, due to the high correlation with some age cohort variables11 specifica-
tions estimated omitting the high education variable lead to significantly negative coefficient
estimates for the proportion of population with ages below 15 and their age dependency
ratio, and significantly positive coefficients for the proportion of population aged 65 or over
and their age dependency ratio. These results suggest that a smaller proportion of children
in the population—because of lower fertility rates—and bigger proportions of the popula-
tion over 65 years—because of higher life expectancy or population pyramids with a smaller
base—result in a higher probability of a transition to a stable democracy. Given the impos-
sibility of disentangling such effects from those of the higher education attainment variable,
these demographic structures can be interpreted as a proxy for human capital accumulation.
Furthermore, the results do not confirm the existence of an (unconditional) youth bulge
effect in terms of transitions to sustained democracy.
Table 4 controls for additional demographic factors. Fertility rates, birth rates, as well as
different mortality indicators as a proxy of health and poverty are included as potential
determinants of the probability of becoming a stable democratic regime. The inclusion
10Also, not controlling for higher education leads to a significantly negative coefficient of the gender gap
difference between age groups for higher education.
11Higher education is highly correlated (correlation above 0.7) with the proportion of population under
15 years of age, and the proportion of people in the working age population in total population, as well as
the age dependency ratio, and the age dependency ratio of young population. The correlation is still high
(over 0.6) with people aged over 65 years and the old age dependency ratio.
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Table 3: Probit regressions: Age structure controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Primary education (15-64) 0.163∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗ 0. 157∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.048) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.050)
Higher education (15-64) 0.153∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗ 0.134∗∗ 0.159∗∗ 0.151∗∗ 0. 134∗∗
(0.065) (0.056) (0.065) (0.060) (0.063) (0.064) (0.059)
Ln(GDP pc) -0.005 -0.010 0.003 -0.011 -0.001 -0.007 -0.011
(0.060) (0.057) (0.061) (0.055) (0.060) (0.060) (0.055)
Prop <15 -0.007
(0.069)
Prop 15-39 0.030
(0.049)
Prop 15-64 -0.016
(0.069)
Prop 65+ 0.040
(0.054)
Age dependency 0.004
(0.066)
Age dependency <15 -0.011
(0.068)
Age dependency 65+ 0.043
(0.052)
N 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Pseudo-R2 0.160 0.163 0.160 0.163 0.159 0.160 0.164
The dependent variable takes value one for sustained democratic episodes.
Marginal effects reported; standard errors in parenthesis. All explanatory variables are standardized.
∗ (∗∗) [∗∗∗] stands for significance at the 10% (5%) [1%] level.
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of these variables leads to a drop in significance for the education variables of the base
specification, what can be attributed to the high correlation of the demographic measures
with higher education.12 Fertility rates, birth rates, and infant mortality turn out to have
a significant influence on the transition probability, with the expected negative sign. Life
expectancy, as expected, has a significantly positive coefficient. The death rate turns out
to be an insignificant regressor.13 Thus, the results here partly confirm the findings from
above where we controlled for different age cohorts. Evaluating all variables at their means,
a one standard deviation decrease in the fertility rate or birth rate rises the probability
of a transition to sustained democracy by 24 percentage points or 16 percentage points,
respectively. Decreasing mortality rates also leads to a higher probability of a transition by
28 percentage points in the case of infant mortality. A one standard deviation increase in life
expectancy leads ceteris paribus to an increase in the transition probability of 19 percentage
points.
In alternative specifications presented in Tables 5, 6 and 7, we include variables related to
other socioeconomic aspects that have been proposed as factors affecting democratization.
Motivated by Lo´pez-Co´rdova and Meissner (2005), we test for effects of trade openness
on the transition to a stable democracy using alternatively measures of exports, imports
and total trade as a share of GDP. While the coefficients of the base variables do not
change qualitatively when controlling for trade flows we find an insignificant effect of all
three openness indicators on the probability of a transition to sustained democracy and thus
cannot confirm the findings of Lo´pez-Co´rdova and Meissner of greater openness leading to
democratization beyond the effects captured by the education variables (see Table 5). Adding
the fraction of the population living in urban areas to the base specification in column (4)
of Table 5, this variable is found to have a significantly positive effect on the transition
to stable democracy, what confirms the findings of Castelo´-Climent. The estimates of the
influence of the education variables do not change qualitatively, although the effect of GDP
per capita turns significantly negative when controlling for urbanization. We also study the
effect of colonial history by introducing a dummy which is equal to one for countries which
were colonies of France, Spain, and the UK in the past. The results shown in column (5)
of Table 5 suggest that while the colonial history of a country has been shown to have a
significant impact on the democratization process (see Barro, 1999; Lipset, 1994; Acemoglu
12Higher education is highly correlated (correlation of above 0.7 in absolute values) with the fertility rate,
the birth rate, infant mortality, and life expectancy.
13Leaving out higher education results in a significantly negative coefficient for the death rate as well.
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Table 4: Probit regressions: Other demographic controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Primary education (15-64) 0.116∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ 0.072 0.097∗ 0.121∗∗
(0.050) (0.051) (0.061) (0.059) (0.055)
Higher education (15-64) -0.026 0.043 0.006 0.064 0.119∗∗
(0.085) (0.084) (0.077) (0.071) (0.060)
Ln(GDP pc) -0.051 -0.046 -0.106 -0.081 -0.039
(0.058) (0.061) (0.069) (0.071) (0.063)
Fertility -0.242∗∗∗
(0.091)
Birth rate -0.159∗
(0.095)
Infant mortality -0.283∗∗∗
(0.104)
Life expectancy 0.188∗
(0.097)
Death rate -0.106
(0.075)
N 100 100 100 100 100
Pseudo-R2 0.215 0.182 0.218 0.185 0.173
The dependent variable takes value one for sustained democratic episodes.
Marginal effects reported; standard errors in parenthesis. All explanatory variables are standardized.
∗ (∗∗) [∗∗∗] stands for significance at the 10% (5%) [1%] level.
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Table 5: Other control variables: openness, urbanization, and colonial history
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Primary education (15-64) 0.183∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.055) (0.049) (0.048) (0.048)
Higher education (15-64) 0.178∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.062) (0.053) (0.055) (0.058)
Ln(GDP pc) -0.013 0.002 -0.003 -0.182∗ -0.004
(0.057) (0.060) (0.054) (0.095) (0.055)
Ln(Imports/GDP) -0.010
(0.049)
Ln(Exports/GDP) -0.066
(0.058)
Ln(TradeVolume/GDP) -0.033
(0.042)
Urbanization 0.237∗∗∗
(0.089)
Colony dummy 0.084
(0.105)
N 88 88 100 100 100
Pseudo-R2 0.175 0.186 0.164 0.212 0.165
The dependent variable takes value one for sustained democratic episodes.
Marginal effects reported; standard errors in parenthesis. All explanatory variables are standardized.
∗ (∗∗) [∗∗∗] stands for significance at the 10% (5%) [1%] level.
et al., 2001) we do not find this variable having a significant effect on the probability of a
country to become a stable democracy.
The results in Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) and Bourguignon and Verdier (2000) suggest
that income inequality matters for democratization. Following Barro (1999), Przeworski
et al. (2000), Glaeser et al. (2004), and Castelo´-Climent (2008), in Table 6 we show the re-
sults of controlling for economic and other dimensions of inequality, such as ethnolinguistic
fractionalization and polarization, as well as the concentration of religion and the the share
of Muslims in total population which has been found to have a negative effect on democra-
tization (see Castelo´-Climent, 2008). All of the inequality measures included additionally in
the regressions (net and gross Gini indicators, measures for ethnolinguistic fractionalization
and polarization, as well as the religion concentration index) turn out to be insignificantly re-
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Table 6: Other control variables: inequality and religion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Primary education (15-64) 0.228∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗ 0.103∗
(0.082) (0.082) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.056)
Higher education (15-64) 0.190∗∗ 0.161∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗
(0.085) (0.088) (0.051) (0.051) (0.061) (0.054)
Ln(GDP pc) 0.074 0.066 0.007 0.009 -0.011 0.020
(0.083) (0.083) (0.053) (0.052) (0.066) (0.057)
Gini net 0.086
(0.081)
Gini gross 0.031
(0.078)
Fractionalization -0.040
(0.050)
Polarization -0.051
(0.049)
Religion concentration 0.012
(0.054)
Muslim -0.110∗
(0.063)
N 66 66 100 100 100 100
Pseudo-R2 0.209 0.196 0.165 0.169 0.160 0.186
The dependent variable takes value one for sustained democratic episodes.
Marginal effects reported; standard errors in parenthesis. All explanatory variables are standardized.
∗ (∗∗) [∗∗∗] stands for significance at the 10% (5%) [1%] level.
lated to a transition to sustained democracy. The coefficient of the share of Muslims in total
population, in contrast, is significantly negative, confirming the findings of Castelo´-Climent
(2008). The coefficients of the base variables are, again, not qualitatively affected.
In Table 7 we also control for the availability of natural resources. Including total natural
resource rents as a regressor, we find a significantly negative relationship with the transition
to sustained democracy, indicating that a one standard deviation increase in natural resource
rents lowers the probability of becoming a sustained democracy by 17 percent. We control
sequentially for forest rents, mineral rents, coal, gas, and oil rents. While forest rents turn
out to have a significantly positive effect on transition probability, only oil rents are found to
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Table 7: Other control variables: natural resources
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Primary education (15-64) 0.173∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗ 0.166 0.206∗∗ 0.204∗∗
(0.057) (0.059) (0.057) (0.112) (0.083) (0.081)
Higher education (15-64) 0.193∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ 0.226∗ 0.214∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.065) (0.060) (0.117) (0.070) (0.071)
Ln(GDP pc) -0.003 0.119∗ 0.008 0.135 0.032 0.052
(0.061) (0.071) (0.060) (0.116) (0.083) (0.076)
Ln(Natural resources) -0.172∗∗∗
(0.052)
Ln(Forest) 0.316∗∗
(0.137)
Ln(Mineral) 0.001
(0.054)
Ln(Coal) -0.095
(0.124)
Ln(Gas) -0.127
(0.078)
Ln(Oil) -0.136∗
(0.070)
N 87 85 87 34 62 63
Pseudo-R2 0.272 0.261 0.187 0.282 0.205 0.206
The dependent variable takes value one for sustained democratic episodes.
Marginal effects reported; standard errors in parenthesis. All explanatory variables are standardized.
∗ (∗∗) [∗∗∗] stands for significance at the 10% (5%) [1%] level.
have a significantly negative coefficient, which is slightly lower than the one of the aggregate
of natural resource rents and equal to around -0.14. Our results are in line with Barro
(1999) and Crespo Cuaresma et al. (2011), who argue that income that is generated from
natural resources lowers the pressure for democratization and tends to prolonge the duration
of autocratic regimes. The coefficient estimates of the education variables are not affected
qualitatively by including these controls, although the income variable turns significantly
positive in the specification which accounts for forest rents.
Given the relatively small number of observations and the strong correlation across variables,
all the estimation results shown were based on small specifications where additional variables
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were added sequentially to the base model, keeping a limited size of the estimated model.
We also estimated alternative specifications based on general-to-specific model specifications
where, starting with a saturated model, we recursively excluded insignificant variables. The
estimation of this model (not shown here but available from the authors upon request)
reinforces our previous results concerning the importance of primary schooling, fertility,
urbanization and natural resources as empirical determinants of stable democracies.
3 Robustness to Definitions of Sustained Democracy
We address the robustness of our results to the definition of sustained political regimes by
classifying our observations based on different spans of regime classification. We reestimate
the models using classifications based on 1, 5, 10, and 20 years.14 The sign and significance
of the coefficient of the vast majority of our explanatory variables is not affected by varying
the length of sustained regimes. There are however several interesting exceptions. As we
decrease the length of the time period without regime change needed for a classification
into regime types—thus sequentially allowing for shorter-lived democracies—the education
attainment and educational gender gap variables lose significance. For the difference in
gender gaps between the young and old population in higher education, the opposite is
true, as the coefficient of this variable becomes significantly negative as we allow for regimes
whose stability is based on shorter spans. The share of young people in the population as
well as the death rate are found to have a significantly negative effect on democratization for
regime classifications based on shorter time windows, but insignificant for sustained regime
changes. The role that the youth bulge plays as a determinant of the birth of democratic
regimes seems to be thus constrained to relatively fragile episodes of democracy, once that
educational variables are controlled for. Variables that, in contrast, become more important
as we place stronger emphasis on the sustainability dimension are income inequality, the
share of Muslims in the population and coal, gas, and oil rents, which have a significantly
negative impact on sustained democratic transitions.
It could be argued that institutional changes tend to take place already before the formal
classification into sustained democracy. We conduct further robustness checks to confirm
that our results are not driven by this potential problem. We reestimate the models after
dropping from our sample those democratic countries with a change in their polity score
14The sample sizes for the base specifications are 147, 132, 122, and 77, respectively.
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of less than 8 within 4 years prior to their classification as sustained democracy, as well
as autocratic countries with a positive change in their polity score. The results presented
in our study do not change qualitatively when based in this reduced group of countries.15
Next, we drop every country that had a polity score higher than -4 four years prior to the
classification of countries into sustained regimes. The results are robust to this change in the
sample of countries. 16 We conduct addtional robustness checks by varying the threshold
value for classifying countries into the democratic and autocratic groups and by ruling out
the possibility that a country is classified as a sustained democracy when it has already had
a polity score above the threshold within the last 20, 30, or 40 years. The main results are
not qualitatively affected by these redefinitions of the dependent variable.
To sum up, these findings suggest that higher educational attainment levels, as well as
decreasing gender gaps in education, especially among the young population are essential for
sustained democratization, while oil rents are found to have a negative impact on sustained
democratization. Despite their influence on sustained democratizations, all of these factors
play a minor role for transitions that are followed by potentially unstable regimes. The
difference in gender gaps between the young and old population in higher education as well
as the share of young people in the population, in contrast are important for democratic
transitions, but not necessarily for transitions to stable regimes.
IV Conclusions
We analyse the role of education, demography, and other socioeconomic factors as a deter-
minant of transitions to stable democratic regimes. Colonial history, trade, and inequality
measures, which are often proposed by the literature to influence (not necessarily sustain-
15The reduced sample does not contain Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Suriname in the
democratic sample and Cameroon, China, Egypt, Gabon, Guinea, and Paraguay from the autocratic sample.
In some specifications higher education and GDP per capita gain significance in this robustness check, while
primary education becomes insignificant in one specification. Also the difference between the gender gaps
between the young and the old working age population in higher education becomes significantly negative.
16This applies to Cape Verde, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Suriname for
the democratic sample and Cape Verde, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Suri-
name for the autocratic sample. These countries are dropped before reestimating the model specifications.
Higher education and GDP per capita gain significance, while primary education turns insignificant in some
specifications. Furthermore, life expectancy turns insignificant, while the age difference in primary educa-
tion turns significantly negative, and the difference between the gender gaps between the young and the old
working age population in primary education turns significantly positive, while the one for higher education
turns significantly negative.
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able) democratic transitions, do not appear to affect sustainable transitions to democracy.
On the other hand, education levels, inequality in education, and demographic structures
appear as robust determinants of sustained democratizations.
Our findings suggest that primary, as well as higher education are important drivers of tran-
sitions towards sustained democracy, while the effect of GDP per capita seems to be a weaker
driver of stable political change once that human capital is controlled for. Following Lipset’s
hypothesis, our results indicate that economic development can be seen as a precondition to
democratization but only as the initiator of a transition towards democracy if it is accompa-
nied by broad-based improvements in educational attainment. The effect of the indicators
for equality in education used in our study indicate that policies aimed at equality in ed-
ucational attainment can have an extra social return related to the development of stable
democratic institutions.
21
A Data Appendix
1 Variable definitions
Variable Explanation Source
sustained Democracy Dummy variable equal to one for countries classified
as sustained democracy.
Marshall, Gurr, and
Jaggers (2011), own
calculations.
Primary education (15-
64)
Proportion of the working age population aged 15-64
years with primary education.
Lutz, Goujon, K.C.,
and Sanderson (2007),
own calculations.
Higher education (15-
64)
Proportion of the working age population aged 15-64
years with secondary or tertiary education.
Lutz, Goujon, K.C.,
and Sanderson (2007),
own calculations.
Ln(GDP pc) PPP converted GDP per capita (Laspeyres), at 2005
constant prices, natural logarithm.
Heston, Summers, and
Aten (2012).
Gender gap primary
(15-64)
Proportion of the male working age population (15-64)
with primary education minus the proportion of the
female working age population (15-64) with primary
education.
Lutz, Goujon, K.C.,
and Sanderson (2007),
own calculations.
Gender gap higher (15-
64)
Proportion of the male working age population (15-64)
with primary education minus the proportion of the
female working age population (15-64) with secondary
or tertiary education.
Lutz, Goujon, K.C.,
and Sanderson (2007),
own calculations.
Gender gap primary
(15-39)
Proportion of the male population aged between 15
and 39 years with primary education minus the pro-
portion of the female population aged between 15 and
39 years with primary education.
Lutz, Goujon, K.C.,
and Sanderson (2007),
own calculations.
Gender gap higher (15-
39)
Proportion of the male population aged between 15
and 39 years with secondary or tertiary education mi-
nus the proportion of the female population aged be-
tween 15 and 39 years with secondary or tertiary ed-
ucation.
Lutz, Goujon, K.C.,
and Sanderson (2007),
own calculations.
Gender gap primary
(40-64)
Proportion of the male population aged between 40
and 64 years with primary education minus the pro-
portion of the female population aged between 40 and
64 years with primary education.
Lutz, Goujon, K.C.,
and Sanderson (2007),
own calculations.
Gender gap higher (40-
64)
Proportion of the male population aged between 40
and 64 years with secondary or higher education minus
the proportion of the female population aged between
40 and 64 years with secondary or tertiary education.
Lutz, Goujon, K.C.,
and Sanderson (2007),
own calculations.
Age difference primary Share of people aged between between 19 and 39 years
with primary education minus the share of people aged
between 40 and 64 with primary education.
Lutz, Goujon, K.C.,
and Sanderson (2007),
own calculations.
Age difference higher Share of people aged between between 19 and 39 years
with secondary or tertiary education minus the share
of people aged between 40 and 64 with secondary or
tertiary education.
Lutz, Goujon, K.C.,
and Sanderson (2007),
own calculations.
Age difference gender
gap primary
Gender gap in primary education of people aged be-
tween 15 and 39 minus the gender gap in primary ed-
ucation of people aged between 15 and 39.
Lutz, Goujon, K.C.,
and Sanderson (2007),
own calculations.
Age difference gender
gap higher
Gender gap in secondary or tertiary education of peo-
ple aged between 15 and 39 minus the gender gap in
secondary or tertiary education of people aged between
15 and 39.
Lutz, Goujon, K.C.,
and Sanderson (2007),
own calculations.
Prop <15 Proportion of people younger than 15 years of total
population.
United Nations (2010),
own calculations.
Prop 15-39 Proportion of people aged between 15 and 39 years of
total population.
United Nations (2010),
own calculations.
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Prop 15-64 Proportion of people aged between 15 and 64 years of
total population.
United Nations (2010),
own calculations.
Prop 65+ Proportion of people older than 65 years of total pop-
ulation.
United Nations (2010),
own calculations.
Age dependency Ratio of people younger than 15 or older than 64 years
to the working age population (between 15 and 64
years).
World Bank (2012).
Age dependency <15 Ratio of people younger than 15 to the working age
population (between 15 and 64 years).
World Bank (2012).
Age dependency 65+ Ratio of people older than 64 years to the working age
population (between 15 and 64 years).
World Bank (2012).
Fertility The average number of children a hypothetical cohort
of women would have at the end of their reproductive
period if they were subject during their whole lives to
the fertility rates of a given period and if they were
not subject to mortality. It is expressed as children
per woman.
United Nations (2010),
own calculations.
Birth rate Number of births over a given period divided by the
person-years lived by the population over that period.
It is expressed as number of births per 1,000 popula-
tion.
United Nations (2010),
own calculations.
Infant mortality Probability of dying between birth and exact age 1. It
is expressed as deaths per 1,000 births.
United Nations (2010),
own calculations.
Life Expectancy The average number of years of life expected by a hy-
pothetical cohort of individuals who would be subject
during all their lives to the mortality rates of a given
period. It is expressed as years.
United Nations (2010),
own calculations.
Death rate Number of deaths over a given period divided by the
person-years lived by the population over that period.
It is expressed as number of deaths per 1,000 popula-
tion.
United Nations (2010),
own calculations.
Ln(Imports/GDP) Imports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP
represent the value of all goods and other market
services received from the rest of the world. They
include the value of merchandise, freight, insurance,
transport, travel, royalties, license fees, and other ser-
vices, such as communication, construction, financial,
information, business, personal, and government ser-
vices. They exclude compensation of employees and
investment income (formerly called factor services)
and transfer payments. In logarithm.
World Bank (2012).
Ln(Exports/GDP) Exports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP
represent the value of all goods and other market ser-
vices provided to the rest of the world. They in-
clude the value of merchandise, freight, insurance,
transport, travel, royalties, license fees, and other ser-
vices, such as communication, construction, financial,
information, business, personal, and government ser-
vices. They exclude compensation of employees and
investment income (formerly called factor services)
and transfer payments.
World Bank (2012).
Ln(TradeVolume/GDP) Sum of exports and imports of goods and services mea-
sured as a share of GDP.
World Bank (2012).
Urbanization Urban population refers to people living in urban areas
defined by national statistical offices as a percentage
of total population. It is calculated using World Bank
population estimates and urban ratios from the United
Nations World Urbanization Prospects.
World Bank (2012).
Colony Dummy variable equal to one if the country was colo-
nized by either France, Spain, or the UK. The colonizer
is defined as colonizing the country for a relatively
long period of time with substantial participation in
the governance of the colonized country.
Mayer and Zignag
(2011).
Gini net Comparable Gini index of net income inequality. Solt (2009).
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Gini gross Comparable Gini index of gross income inequality. Solt (2009).
Fractionalization The probability that two randomly picked individuals
belong to different groups at the most aggregated level.
Desmet, Ortuno-Ortin,
and Wacziarg (2012).
Polarization Linguistic polarization index that is maximized when
there are two groups of equal size. Polarization mea-
sure from Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005).
Desmet, Ortuno-Ortin,
and Wacziarg (2012).
Religion concentration Herfindahl index of religion shares, including non-
religion.
Barro (2003).
Muslim Share of Muslims in total population. Barro (2003).
Ln(Natural resources) Total natural resources rents are the sum of oil rents,
natural gas rents, coal rents (hard and soft), mineral
rents, and forest rents, as a percentage of GDP. Nat-
ural logarithm.
World Bank (2012).
Ln(Forest) Forest rents are roundwood harvest times the product
of average prices and a region-specific rental rate, as a
percentage of GDP. Natural logarithm.
World Bank (2012).
Ln(Mineral) Mineral rents are the difference between the value of
production for a stock of minerals at world prices and
their total costs of production, as a percentage of GDP.
Minerals included in the calculation are tin, gold, lead,
zinc, iron, copper, nickel, silver, bauxite, and phos-
phate. Natural logarithm.
World Bank (2012).
Ln(Coal) Coal rents are the difference between the value of both
hard and soft coal production at world prices and their
total costs of production, a a percentage of GDP. Nat-
ural logarithm.
World Bank (2012).
Ln(Gas) Natural gas rents are the difference between the value
of natural gas production at world prices and total
costs of production, as a percentage of GDP. Natural
logarithm.
World Bank (2012).
Ln(Oil) Oil rents are the difference between the value of crude
oil production at world prices and total costs of pro-
duction, as a percentage of GDP. Natural logarithm.
World Bank (2012).
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2 Descriptive statistics
Table 9: Summary statistics
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Sustained Democracy 100 0.290 0.456 0.000 1.000
Primary education (15-64) 100 0.310 0.190 0.023 0.722
Higher education (15-64) 100 0.266 0.273 0.004 0.945
Ln(GDP pc) 100 7.696 1.042 5.830 10.798
Gender gap primary (15-64) 100 0.059 0.088 -0.238 0.301
Gender gap higher (15-64) 100 0.070 0.061 -0.037 0.265
Gender gap primary (15-39) 100 0.058 0.093 -0.234 0.338
Gender gap higher (15-39) 100 0.071 0.071 -0.061 0.313
Gender gap primary (40-64) 100 0.062 0.104 -0.257 0.302
Gender gap higher (40-64) 100 0.062 0.065 -0.046 0.319
Age difference primary 100 0.053 0.147 -0.338 0.334
Age difference higher 100 0.123 0.102 -0.014 0.469
Age difference gender gap primary 100 -0.003 0.091 -0.219 0.235
Age difference gender gap higher 100 0.008 0.074 -0.243 0.167
Prop <15 100 0.405 0.077 0.207 0.504
Prop 15-39 100 0.332 0.024 0.285 0.407
Prop 15-64 100 0.567 0.062 0.477 0.705
Prop 65+ 100 0.047 0.028 0.014 0.141
Age dependency 100 81.489 16.766 46.022 111.993
Age dependency <15 100 73.511 19.428 29.365 105.327
Age dependency 65+ 100 7.978 3.780 2.212 20.141
Fertility 100 5.110 1.863 1.287 7.953
Birth rate 100 36.269 11.918 9.000 55.714
Infant mortality 100 87.824 47.268 13.000 188.000
Life Expectancy 100 56.706 10.862 34.829 74.140
Death rate 100 13.709 6.012 2.871 29.476
Ln(Imports/GDP) 88 3.422 0.567 1.959 5.029
Ln(Exports/GDP) 88 3.119 0.625 1.682 4.849
Ln(TradeVolume/GDP) 100 3.838 0.723 1.696 5.221
Urbanization 100 38.636 21.132 3.122 91.710
Colony 100 0.610 0.490 0.000 1.000
Gini net 66 40.071 10.935 20.010 58.640
Gini gross 66 45.828 11.923 22.982 72.911
Fractionalization 100 0.150 0.175 0.000 0.647
Polarization 100 0.273 0.305 0.000 0.997
Religion concentration 100 0.608 0.214 0.177 1.000
Muslim 100 0.268 0.351 0.000 0.997
Ln(Natural resources) 87 1.634 1.317 -2.164 4.701
Ln(Forest) 85 -0.485 4.618 -27.631 3.325
Ln(Mineral) 87 -11.006 12.657 -27.631 2.957
Ln(Coal) 34 -6.479 9.206 -27.631 1.498
Ln(Gas) 62 -13.152 13.439 -27.631 4.493
Ln(Oil) 63 -9.079 13.835 -27.631 3.760
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Table 10: Summary statistics for sustained autocracies
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Sustained Democracy 71 0 0 0 0
Primary education (15-64) 71 0.2769808 0.1859092 0.0228403 0.7222776
Higher education (15-64) 71 0.2187055 0.2604057 0.003953 0.9454886
Ln(GDP pc) 71 7.534988 1.005806 5.953117 10.79756
Gender gap primary (15-64) 71 0.0718353 0.0919568 -0.2382785 0.3008336
Gender gap higher (15-64) 71 0.0787629 0.0625093 -0.0310601 0.2652708
Gender gap primary (15-39) 71 0.0706619 0.1007552 -0.2335641 0.3376227
Gender gap higher (15-39) 71 0.0852015 0.0726396 -0.0238359 0.3127269
Gender gap primary (40-64) 71 0.0737501 0.1044698 -0.2571845 0.3019834
Gender gap higher (40-64) 71 0.0594278 0.0606467 -0.0461341 0.2153649
Age difference primary 71 0.0820596 0.1272622 -0.3382764 0.3336853
Age difference higher 71 0.1063848 0.0946735 -0.0144402 0.3731081
Age difference gender gap primary 71 -0.0030882 0.0964502 -0.2185826 0.2354707
Age difference gender gap higher 71 0.0257738 0.0686777 -0.1866037 0.1666486
Prop <15 71 0.4170658 0.0692761 0.2068285 0.5041659
Prop 15-39 71 0.3282139 0.0194291 0.2853803 0.4035589
Prop 15-64 71 0.5585853 0.0576554 0.4770745 0.7050869
Prop 65+ 71 0.0419334 0.0231754 0.0143358 0.1388962
Age dependency 71 83.8784 15.71753 46.02231 111.9925
Age dependency <15 71 76.59744 17.73382 29.36535 105.3268
Age dependency 65+ 71 7.28095 3.105862 2.212222 19.66516
Fertility 71 5.612546 1.693806 1.286667 7.953125
Birth rate 71 39.13911 10.84978 9 55.71429
Infant mortality 71 101.0058 44.32882 13 188
Life Expectancy 71 53.90968 10.39805 34.82857 72.68613
Death rate 71 15.12511 6.076022 2.870968 29.47619
Ln(Imports/GDP) 60 3.415615 0.565159 2.227416 4.555392
Ln(Exports/GDP) 60 3.101612 0.6497937 1.681576 4.548329
Ln(TradeVolume/GDP) 71 3.871084 0.7590604 1.696368 5.221024
Urbanization 71 33.98446 20.20554 3.12215 91.71018
Colony 71 0.6197183 0.4889112 0 1
Gini net 41 39.63182 10.7134 20.01046 58.64023
Gini gross 41 45.70879 12.73624 22.98208 70.58811
Fractionalization 71 0.1593535 0.1743235 0 0.5499
Polarization 71 0.2927423 0.3104921 0 0.9685
Religion concentration 71 0.6069916 0.209067 0.2575825 1
Muslim 71 0.3408084 0.372918 0 0.9970909
Ln(Natural resources) 58 1.961419 1.18959 -1.231354 4.701366
Ln(Forest) 56 -0.8042202 5.607875 -27.63102 3.325389
Ln(Mineral) 58 -11.38229 12.58325 -27.63102 2.956882
Ln(Coal) 20 -7.632162 10.48178 -27.63102 1.497516
Ln(Gas) 39 -11.68408 13.60751 -27.63102 4.492837
Ln(Oil) 39 -7.247159 13.86087 -27.63102 3.759881
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Table 11: Summary statistics for sustained democracies
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Sustained Democracy 29 1 0 1 1
Primary education (15-64) 29 0.3918276 0.1793204 0.0359376 0.6752232
Higher education (15-64) 29 0.3832673 0.2704488 0.0396101 0.9366733
Ln(GDP pc) 29 8.091129 1.038989 5.830173 9.650395
Gender gap primary (15-64) 29 0.0279991 0.0676237 -0.0732856 0.1965513
Gender gap higher (15-64) 29 0.0494336 0.0524661 -0.0373646 0.1865375
Gender gap primary (15-39) 29 0.0278506 0.0611734 -0.0674081 0.2103899
Gender gap higher (15-39) 29 0.0352273 0.0539899 -0.0607191 0.1955138
Gender gap primary (40-64) 29 0.0318553 0.0974306 -0.1664118 0.264552
Gender gap higher (40-64) 29 0.0695719 0.0741618 -0.0250465 0.3193385
Age difference primary 29 -0.0174529 0.1682601 -0.300652 0.3194541
Age difference higher 29 0.1649275 0.1086726 0.0256169 0.4693
Age difference gender gap primary 29 -0.0040047 0.0794619 -0.1972551 0.1860333
Age difference gender gap higher 29 -0.0343446 0.071496 -0.2425855 0.0534916
Prop <15 29 0.3747902 0.0868201 0.2132127 0.4825551
Prop 15-39 29 0.3408966 0.0317572 0.2887768 0.4072282
Prop 15-64 29 0.5887262 0.0677857 0.5014321 0.7040341
Prop 65+ 29 0.0593961 0.0354209 0.0298187 0.1409416
Age dependency 29 75.63747 18.06578 47.02202 102.146
Age dependency <15 29 65.95299 21.56526 30.46883 96.2237
Age dependency 65+ 29 9.684472 4.705852 5.685187 20.14104
Fertility 29 3.879655 1.700652 1.5 7.01
Birth rate 29 29.24138 11.65472 10 49
Infant mortality 29 55.55172 38.31037 13 134
Life Expectancy 29 63.55276 8.858012 44.13 74.14
Death rate 29 10.24138 4.239737 5 20
Ln(Imports/GDP) 28 3.436478 0.5814831 1.959435 5.029167
Ln(Exports/GDP) 28 3.157598 0.5769437 1.896513 4.84855
Ln(TradeVolume/GDP) 29 3.757173 0.6295515 2.412162 5.071878
Urbanization 29 50.02327 19.21258 12.9224 87.194
Colony 29 0.5862069 0.50123 0 1
Gini net 25 40.79087 11.4755 20.8216 58.46661
Gini gross 25 46.02419 10.70461 26.51189 72.91129
Fractionalization 29 0.1274448 0.1791687 0 0.6466
Polarization 29 0.2249034 0.2916121 0 0.9974
Religion concentration 29 0.6107806 0.2302169 0.177126 0.939498
Muslim 29 0.0885517 0.2057737 0 0.822
Ln(Natural resources) 29 0.9784243 1.333932 -2.163747 3.168397
Ln(Forest) 29 0.1322243 1.267044 -3.080206 2.286761
Ln(Mineral) 29 -10.25421 12.99309 -27.63102 2.78427
Ln(Coal) 14 -4.832243 7.042781 -27.63102 1.174318
Ln(Gas) 23 -15.64066 13.06416 -27.63102 1.628898
Ln(Oil) 24 -12.05474 13.55135 -27.63102 1.916684
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